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Birth Rights and Wrongs Extended

REUVEN BRANDT*

I. INTRODUCTION
Dov Fox’s Birth Rights and Wrongs1 offers a largely compelling argument
for expanding the scope of legal actions and remedies available to those
whose reproductive choices are wrongfully frustrated by the actions of
others. The dominant focus of the book is individuals who, due to the
negligence and/or malice of medical professionals, suffer harms arising
from reproduction imposed, denied, or confounded.2 A serious examination
of these kinds of injuries is certainly appropriate given that medical
professionals are increasingly involved in individuals’ reproductive plans
and that serious harms may arise when desired medical interventions are
improperly implemented. I will not take issue with the general framework
developed by Fox for addressing these kinds of harms. My focus here will
be to show that Fox’s arguments have consequences for two kinds of cases
that lie beyond the scope of those he explicitly acknowledges. The first is
instances of reproductive wrongs that occur outside the confines of the
patient/medical practitioner relationship. The second is claims made by
children for harms suffered in virtue of being denied contact with their
biological parents and/or access to identifying information about their
biological parents.

*
© 2021 Reuven Brandt. Department of Philosophy, University of California
San Diego.
1. D OV F OX , B IRTH R IGHTS AND W RONGS : H OW M EDICINE AND T ECHNOLOGY A RE
REMAKING REPRODUCTION AND THE LAW (2019) [hereinafter FOX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND WRONGS].
2. By reproduction confounded, Fox means cases in which preferences about the
traits one’s offspring will possess are frustrated as a result of a wrongdoing.
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In discussing the first kind of case, I will argue that the reason offered
by Fox for limiting legal actions to instances of professional malpractice
does not succeed. I take this to be a friendly criticism of the overall project.
Removing this limitation would, I argue, provide an avenue of redress for
serious wrongs. The discussion of the second kind of case raises more
questions than answers. The main thrust of the argument is a parity claim.
Fox enumerates multiple reasons for legal recognition of the harm suffered
to adults deprived of a relationship with biological offspring. I show that
in many cases these same justifications (or their close analogues) apply to
children deprived of a relationship with biological parents. This raises worries
about current donor anonymity practices, and perhaps donor assisted
reproduction more generally. A natural initial response is to point to the
non-identity problem as a means for rendering moot any concerns that
might arise as a result of this parity claim. But I will offer two reasons for
why this appeal does not suffice. First, there are cases in which the relevant
chain of events does not affect the identity of the child who subsequently
lacks a relationship with their biological parents. Second and more
controversially, appeals to the non-identity problem might not suffice for
rendering null the obligations biological progenitors have towards their
offspring. I say “might” advisedly. Much will depend on one’s view of the
standing and content of causal procreative responsibilities. Policy
considerations might also push in the opposite direction. For instance,
the degree of harm suffered by offspring and the weight of countervailing
goods might push against recognizing such responsibilities in law and policy,
notwithstanding their theoretical basis. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to discuss in detail exactly how policy ought to respond in light of these
competing concerns. In the interests of transparency I will put my cards on
the table and state that I find uncompelling arguments defending a general
right of donor conceived individuals to access identifying information
about their progenitors. 3 Nevertheless, what I wish to establish is that
Fox’s move to explicitly recognize the harm of being denied a relationship
with biologically related children opens a Pandora’s box of questions that
lies at the at the heart of law, policy, and morality governing assisted
reproduction.
II. PRIVATE REPRODUCTIVE WRONGS
Fox’s discussion of reproductive wrongdoings that occur outside the
confines of a professional setting or in the absence of a formal contractual
3. For a discussion of some of the justifications given for recognizing such a
right, see Vardit Ravitsky, Autonomous Choice and the Right to Know One’s Genetic
Origins, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 36, 36–37 (2014).
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agreement—what I will call private reproductive wrongs—is brief. After
a short discussion of competing views, Fox settles on the absence of a
formal duty of care as the best justification for exempting private
reproductive wrongs from his proposed tort schema.4 Fox is correct that
the standard of care owed by medical professionals or others who have
entered into a formal contractual agreement is greater than the standard of
care owed by private parties engaging in consensual sexual activity. This
heightened standard of care does indeed broaden what constitutes actionable
negligence in the professional context. Consider an individual who, despite a
good faith effort misinforms a sexual partner about the chances of transmitting
a congenital disorder to potential offspring. We might think that this
misrepresentation does not rise to the level of negligence. However, a
similar misrepresentation made by a genetic counsellor during a medical
visit might very well constitute negligence. Similarly, an individual whose
improper storage of a contraceptive contributes to its failure might not act
negligently, even though a pharmacist who acts similarly might. But accepting
that professionals have a heightened duty of care does not establish that
‘caveat emptor’ is the correct legal response to claims of private reproductive
wrongdoing. Concerns about justice and consistency provide strong
reasons for recognizing private reproductive wrongs. As will be outlined
below, this is clearest in cases of intentional wrongdoing such as fraud and
contraceptive sabotage that result in reproduction imposed. While I will
focus most attention on this kind of case, I will briefly explain why analogous
arguments apply to cases of reproduction confounded as well.
In many circumstances the absence of a formal duty of care does not
preclude private parties from duties to each other. Homeowners have duties
toward their guests to maintain their property in adequate repair and are
liable for injuries that result from negligently failing to do so. Individuals
who create a risk of harm to others have a duty to warn others of the risks
imposed. Failure to provide adequate warning or failure to take reasonable
steps to minimize the risks renders one liable for damages. And more
closely analogous to the matter at hand, fraudulent misrepresentation of risks
vitiates consent that would otherwise insulate an actor from liability for
damages. In law this true even in certain cases where ‘lovers lie.’
Fraudulently concealing a sexually transmitted infection vitiates consent and
makes the perpetrator liable for sexual battery. This is true even in cases

4.

FOX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND WRONGS, at 29.
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in which there was no intent to transmit the disease,5 and in cases where
no disease was in fact transmitted.6
What is at stake here is autonomy. It is a clear violation of autonomy to
mislead someone about the risks engendered by an activity in order to
secure their participation. Individuals have the right to judge for themselves
what risks are worth what benefits and act accordingly. Deception and
fraud about risks rob individuals of this opportunity, and in so doing
violate autonomy. In this regard, decisions about sexual intimacy are no
different. While individuals have very weighty privacy, dignity and bodily
integrity interests in choosing whom to engage in intimate contact with
and what shape that intimate contact will take, the matter of “who” is not
the whole story. Part of these decisions is surely based on the risks posed
by different intimate activities and the manner in which they are conducted.
An individual with little knowledge of a potential partner’s sexual history
might reasonably insist on using contraceptive methods that reduce the
likelihood of disease transmission in the absence of a clean bill of health.
Fraudulently misrepresenting one’s health status or surreptitiously removing
a contraceptive device wrongly exposes an intimate partner to risks they
did not consent to, thus vitiating consent to the sexual act. The actor engaging
in the deception is rightfully liable for damages that arise as a consequence
of this deception, even in the absence of a formal duty of care. Indeed,
the Restatement of Torts (Second) uses a similar example to illustrate
battery following consent induced by misrepresentation.7
While it may seem crass to compare unwanted procreation with contracting
a disease, given Fox’s arguments it is unclear why a similar analysis ought
not apply in the case of private reproductive wrongdoing. Concerns about
the possibility of unwanted procreation frequently plays an important role
in determining the form sexual contact will take, including what contraceptive
measures are material to consent. This is because unwanted procreation is
accompanied by considerable costs. Indeed the costs resulting from
unwanted procreation are in many cases more burdensome than the less
serious sexually transmitted disease for which damages may be awarded
when consent is vitiated by fraud or deception. In the U.S. the cost of
raising a child from birth to 17 is upwards of 230,000 dollars.8 Beyond the
financial costs, procreation generally requires a large scale shift in the way

5.
6.
7.
8.

Johnson v. Jones, 269 Ore. App. 12 (Ore. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at n.7.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 892B.
U.S. DEPT. OF A GRICULTURE . 2015 EXPENDITURES ON C HILDREN BY
FAMILIES , N O. 1528-2105 (2017), https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/
expenditures_on_children_by_families/crc2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WTR-ETYH].
This is a statistic that Fox relies upon as well.
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individuals lead their lives. Additionally, becoming responsible for the
care of children can negatively impact earning potential, career advancement,
and one’s ability to pursue higher education. Notably, these effects are
generally more pronounced for women. Fox adeptly demonstrates that
arguments purporting to show that the benefits of procreation more than
offset these kinds of costs do not succeed. Indeed, as Fox and others gave
demonstrated, such arguments are in tension with standard ways offsetting
benefits are determined in cases not involving reproduction.9 We thus
have good reason to think that reproduction imposed carries substantial
costs. If fraudulent misrepresentation about the risks of sexually transmitted
diseases occurring within the bounds of personal relationships renders
individuals liable for damages, it is unclear why fraudulent misrepresentation
about the risks of procreation arising in similar circumstances does not.
Simply pointing to the absence of a formal duty of care will not do.
One may point to the interests of a third party, the child that is created,
as an important disanalogy when comparing fraud resulting in disease
transmission with fraud resulting in procreation. It is certainly true that
the interests of the resulting child are critically important, and this is a
concern that does not arise in disease cases. However, it is unclear whether
the presence or absence of a formal duty of care affects these interests in
a way that would permit a parent to seek damages in the former case but
preclude it in the latter. Otherwise put, if Fox believes that the child- centric
reasons for dismissing damages in cases of medical malpractice do not
succeed10 (a view I endorse), it is unclear why they would fare better
when raised in response to private reproductive wrongdoings. To illustrate
this point, consider a few of the child-centric reasons courts have offered
for denying plaintiffs damages following the birth of a healthy child. One
reason courts have given is that it would be damaging to a child to learn
that their parent(s) considered it an injury to raise them.11 A second reason
is that it may be injurious to the parent-child relationship for the child to
learn that their parent(s) is in essence being paid by a third party to care
for them. It is not at all apparent how the nature of these supposed harms
changes in the absence of a formal duty of care. In both cases the alleged
harm arises as a result of the child’s (possible) perception that in seeking

9. FOX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND WRONGS, at 119.
10. Id. at 141–64.
11. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982); C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504,
514 (Utah 1988).
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damages the parent is indicating that the child’s presence in the parent’s
life constitutes a harm and is thus unwanted. But this perception seems
unaffected by the identity of the defendant or whether that defendant was
under a formal duty of care to prevent conception from occurring. I cannot
see why a child would be injured by the discovery that a parent had sought
damages for wrongful conception from a sexual partner who had lied about
using a condom, but not suffer similar harm when damages are sought
against a doctor who had lied about having performed a successful tubal
ligation.12 More work would be needed in order to show that child-centric
reasons justify carving out an exception for private reproductive wrongs.
However, even if one is convinced children may suffer emotional harm
as a result, it is not at all clear whether this suffices to bar legal recognition
of private reproductive wrongs. The interests of children, as important as
they are, do not always take precedence over the interests of adults. As
others including Fox have noted, we do not extinguish the parental rights
of the willing biological parents of a newborn on the grounds that some
other party is also interested in parenting the same child and is likely to
do a better job. In some cases allowing an adult to recover losses suffered
due to fraudulent misrepresentation might also take precedence over the
wellbeing of a child. Indeed, recognizing such cases is not without
precedent.
Normally equitable estoppel precludes a father from contesting paternity
after he has welcomed a child into his home, held the child out as his own,
and formed an emotional bond with the child. The justification for this
principle is to protect the interests of minor children. But some courts have
ruled that if the father’s actions that would normally give rise to estoppel
were they the result of fraudulent misrepresentations about his paternity,
the principle of paternity by estoppel can be set aside even after a
relationship has formed.13 In justifying this decision one court stated that,
“there is a strong public policy against permitting a party who has acted
in reliance upon a misrepresentation to suffer harm.”14 These cases are
disanalogous from ‘reproduction imposed’ in that there is no biological
relationship between the individual seeking remedy for fraud and the child
that stands to suffer as a result. But unless we are willing to commit to the
claim that biological ties result in a stronger form of parental standing than
that formed as a result of emotional bonds that form as a results of actual

12. Some courts have allowed for recoveries for child-rearing costs in these cases.
E.g., Nelson v. Davidson, 456 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 1990); Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez,
805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1990).
13. N.C. v. M.H., 923 A.2d 499 (Penn. 2007); McConnell v. Berkheimer, 781 A.2d
206 (Penn. 2001); Gebler v. Gatti, 895 A.2d 1 (Penn. 2006).
14. Id.
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parenting (a view that we have plenty of reason to reject) then this
disanalogy should not detract from the force of the example.
Failing to recognize private reproductive wrongdoings can also result
in a striking injustice. Consider the following hypothetical case. Sandra
and James are “friends with benefits.” Sandra would like to have children,
but James does not. Sandra proposes that she and James enter into a gamete
donation arrangement whereby James will provide Sandra sperm for use
in an artificial insemination procedure that she would administer herself.
Per the agreement, James would be a mere sperm donor and would have
no obligations toward the child. James declines, stating that he would
inevitably feel obliged to have a role in the child’s life, and that is a
responsibility he wants to avoid. Nevertheless, Sandra fraudulently acquires
James’ sperm, inseminates herself, and has a child.
Since artificial insemination occurred in the absence of a gamete donation
agreement, James is now liable for child maintenance obligations. This
result is striking because had James agreed to the sperm donation agreement,
he would be free of such obligations. We thus have a situation whereby
individuals can divest themselves of legal parental obligations when voluntarily
making their gametes available for reproductive use, but cannot do so
when their gametes are fraudulently accessed for reproductive purposes.
Matters are made worse when we switch the roles of the parties in the
example. Imagine that James requests that Sandra donate ova for use in a
surrogacy, but Sandra declines. James then surreptitiously inseminates
Sandra during an intimate act in which insemination is not a “natural
outcome.” Not only does Sandra acquire weighty legal obligations she
would not accrue had she agreed to donate ova, but she also suffers the
physical and emotional harm of undergoing an unwanted pregnancy. But
the additional harms are not constrained to the burdens of pregnancy and
childbirth. There is also strong evidence suggesting that motherhood has
a larger impact on an individual’s interests (career advancement, education,
etc.) than fatherhood does.
One option may be to change the way legal parental status and its
constitutive obligations are ascribed, and indeed elsewhere I have argued
that some changes in this domain of law are in order. 15 But as a sole
solution, this is not entirely satisfactory. As Fox notes, some individuals
may feel they have obligations to their biological offspring regardless of
whether such obligations are mandated by the state. And echoing Fox’s
15.

Reuven Brandt, Sperm, Clinics, and Parenthood, 30 BIOETHICS 618 (2016).
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rejection of adoption as means of mitigating damages, we might also think
that requiring individuals to forgo legal parental status and hence a
protected parental relationship with their offspring in order to mitigate
costs is an unreasonable requirement. A better way for rectifying this
injustice would be to extend Fox’s reproductive torts into the private sphere.
This discussion has focused on reproduction imposed, but similar
arguments can be made in cases of reproduction confounded and reproduction
denied. The likelihood of creating offspring with serious illness informs
individuals’ decisions about who to reproduce with, and what precautions
to take in order to minimize the risks of creating a child with severe illness.
For instance, some communities that are affected by Tay Sachs disease
employ widespread screening and registries to minimize the risks of creating
offspring who will suffer from this debilitating disease. Deceiving a partner
about the result of a screening test vitiates consent in a similar manner to
deceiving an individual about the risk of contracting a sexually transmitted
infection. While the particular interest at stake is different, concerns about
the needs of future offspring are surely material to consent in reproductive
matters. It is further worth noting that such concerns need not rest on the
pernicious view that the lives of individuals with certain disabilities are of
lesser value. A potential parent may be concerned about their ability to fulfill
the needs of offspring born with certain disabilities. Seeking compensation
for these costs neither explicitly nor implicitly rests on the view that those
born with disabilities are of lesser value.16
One further point worth mentioning is that it may not be necessary to
create novel torts in order to redress the wrongs illuminated by Fox. In the
case of private reproductive wrongs, it seems that expanding the scope of
sexual battery might suffice. In cases involving medical professionals we
might think that a similar expansion of medical negligence and battery
might also suffice. On this matter I have no settled view. However, one
advantage of creating a new domain of torts is that doing so would emphasize
the special importance of reproductive harms.
III. BIOLOGICAL CONNECTIONS AND HARM
This second line of commentary is more speculative than the first. Here
I will argue that legally recognizing a distinct harm in being denied the
opportunity to raise biological offspring raises conceptual problems that
lie at the heart of debates about donor assisted reproduction and donor
anonymity. What is at stake is the importance, if any, of causal connections
when attributing moral responsibilities for ensuring the wellbeing of children
16. Some cases reproduction denied may fall under this rubric as well—for instances
cases in which a concealed sexually transmitted infection results in infertility.
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and the value of biological ties. The ‘thin edge of the wedge’ into this
broader debate is a parity claim about the justification for recognizing
harms suffered by adults when they are denied biological children. Similar
concerns apply to children denied a connection with biological parents.
My analysis will focus on ethical matters, and I will leave open what this
implies about law and policy. I will emphasize at the outset that this argument
is controversial in two important respects. First, it relies on a causal
account of procreative responsibilities that, while not without support in
the ethics literature,17 remains contentious. Second, the argument relies on
a controversial claim about the limits of the non-identity problem.
Fox argues that alternative means of becoming a parent do not eliminate
the harm of being denied the opportunity to parent a biological child. Fox’s
explicit focus is on adoption, but the reasons offered extend to use of
donor gametes and surrogacy as well. Fox makes two central claims about
the inadequacy of alternatives. The first is that these alternatives are not
without their own associated costs. Adoption, as well as gamete donation
and surrogacy arrangements, are often expensive, time consuming, and
involve non-trivial invasions of privacy—the latter is especially true
in the case of adoption. Indeed many have called for reforming the current
system that places extra scrutiny on individuals seeking to become parents
through non-traditional means.18 In the absence of such reform however,
we might think that there is a fairly straightforward solution. Individuals
could be compensated for both the financial costs and the invasion of
privacy that may be required in order to become a parent following a relevant
reproductive wrong. The second inadequacy raises deeper questions. Fox
suggests that the loss of biological ties with offspring is itself an injury in
need of redress. The reason Fox gives is that many parents in fact do yearn
for a biologically related child. The reasons for this preference are diverse.
17. See Giuliana Fuscaldo, Genetic Ties: Are They Morally Binding?, 20 BIOETHICS
64 (2006); Rivka Weinberg, The Moral Complexity of Sperm Donation, 22 BIOETHICS 166
(2008); Lindsey Porter, Why and How to Prefer a Causal Account of Parenthood, 45 J.
SOC. PHIL. 182 (2014); James L. Nelson, Special Responsibilities of Parents Using Technologically
Assisted Reproduction, in Family-Making, CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL CHALLENGES (Franҫoise
Baylis & Carolyn McLeod eds., 2014); Reuven Brandt, The Transfer and Delegation of
Responsibilities for Genetic Offspring in Gamete Provision, 34 J. APP. PHIL. 665 (2017);
Don Hubin, Procreators’ Duties, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS (Leslie
Francis, ed., 2008).
18. Carolyn Mcleod & Andrew Botterell, “Not for the Faint of Heart:” Assessing
the Status Quo on Adoption and Parental Licensing”, in FAMILY-MAKING: CONTEMPORARY
ETHICAL CHALLENGES (Franҫoise Baylis & Carolyn McLeod eds., 2014).
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As Fox notes, biological ties lie at the heart of many individuals’ conception
of the family and indeed have a privileged place in law. Some prospective
parents place importance on having offspring that will resemble them. For
others, genetic ties are of important cultural significance, and continuing
a genetic line might be a central impetus behind their desire to reproduce.
However, if we recognize this second kind of concern as genuine, we
are faced with a problem. These same sources of harm may impact children
created via donor gametes who lack a connection with their biological parents.
While many individuals conceived by anonymous donor conception report
no psychological distress, some do. Those that do often report that biological
ties are central to their conception of family, and so feel a loss in not
knowing their ‘real family’. Some discover that they are not of the same
ethnicity as their social/legal parents, and as result lack a sense of belonging
and feel deprived of a connection with their ‘true’ ethnic group. In support
of recognizing such harms, David Velleman argues that being raised apart
from one’s biological relations places donor-conceived individuals at a
disadvantage. According to Velleman, close genetic relatives provide children
with a kind of mirror on themselves which enables self knowledge, and
provides an individual with a connection to their ancestry that helps
children orient themselves in the world.19 If we are prepared to legally
acknowledge similar harms in the case of adults who are deprived a
biological tie with their offspring, we have a prima facie reason to
recognize these harms when they arise in children. At a minimum, this
raises serious questions about the permissibility of donor anonymity.
A. The Appeal to the Non-Identity Problem
One way to sidestep this problem is to appeal to the non-identity problem.
The non-identity problem is one of the most vexing problems in reproductive
ethics. The problem highlights a tension between plausible moral principles
and what they seem to permit. It thus forces us to give up on deeply held
principles, or else accept behavior that seems intuitively morally problematic.
The problem is best illustrated through a slightly modified version of one
of Derek Parfit’s examples.20
Imagine a 14 year old couple who decide to have a child. Because of
their young age, their child has a poor start to life. This poor start has
detrimental effects on the child throughout their life. The child’s life, while
hard, is still well above the threshold of ‘a life worth living’. Had the couple
waited a few years they would have had a child with a much better start
to life.
19.
20.
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J. David Velleman, The Gift of Life, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 245 (2008).
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
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Many think that the couple’s decision not to wait is wrong. But justifying
this response is challenging. The trouble arises when we recognize that
had the couple waited, they would have had a different child. This is
because the child that the couple would have had if they had waited would
have been the product of a union between different sperm and ova. The
couple’s choice is not between having child A with a poor start in life and
the same child A with a better start. The choice is between having child A
with a poor start in life and child B with a better start in life.
That we are comparing different possible children poses a problem because
we normally think that an action is wrong only if someone is wronged by it.
Furthermore, we normally think that someone is harmed only if they are
made worse off than they otherwise would be. If we reflect on the case of
the young child it is hard to see how child A was wronged or harmed. Had
the parents waited, A would not exist at all. Since A’s life is worth living,
it is hard to see how the parents have wronged A. After all, they gave A a
worthwhile life and A’s only alternative was no life at all. Similarly, the
parents have seemingly not harmed A. The decision to forgo waiting to
conceive did not make A worse off than they otherwise would be. Had the
parents waited, A would not exist at all. Since A’s life is worth living, coming
into existence did not make A worse off than they otherwise would be. If
the couple’s choice does not harm or wrong A, then it’s hard to see why
the action is wrong, assuming no one else is harmed or wronged by the
decision, which we will stipulate for the sake of argument.21
This argument has been applied to the question of donor anonymity in
order to show that donor-conceived offspring are not harmed or wronged
by policies that sever ties between them and their biological progenitors.
For instance, I. Glenn Cohen argues that changing policy to abolish donor
anonymity cannot be justified on the grounds that the status quo causes
harm. This is because if the policy would have been different, in all likelihood
different donor-conceived children would have been created. This is because
the pool of gamete donors willing to have their identity accessible by their
biological offspring is different from those who do not. Similarly, those
willing to make use of non-anonymous donor gametes is different from
those willing to make use of anonymous donor gametes. Cohen thus concludes
that individuals conceived via anonymous donor gametes are not harmed,

21. This stipulation is fairly standard in discussion of the non-identity problem.
This is because normally we are primarily interested in whether the child created has been
harmed or wronged, and so we put aside the interests of other who may be affected.
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as had the policies been different they would not exist at all. Had policies
been different, other donor-conceived individuals would exist in their place.22
At first blush, this argument seems to provide a way out of the problem.
Since donor anonymity neither harms nor wrongs anybody, we need not
worry about the interests donor-conceived individuals may have in having
relationships with their biological relations. However, I will show that on
reflection this appeal to the non-identity problem to sidestep worries about
harm to children arising from severed ties with biological relations. First,
the appeal to the non-identity problem will not apply to all cases in which
a child alleges wrongdoing with respect to severed biological ties. Assuming
genetic essentialism about identity, cases where embryos are swapped by
a clinic will not raise non-identity concerns. Thus at least in this relatively
small subset of cases, there are grounds for harm to offspring. But more
controversially, I will show that the preceding argument is a misapplication
of the non-identity problem. The argument fails because it presumes that
gamete providers have no moral obligations toward their offspring. Before
making the case that gamete providers have moral obligations toward their
offspring, I will first show why recognizing such obligations deflates the force
of the non-identity problem in this case.
At its core, the non-identity problem forces us to reckon with the
possibility that certain actions which may intuitively appear harmful or
wrong may not indeed be so. If the non-identity problem succeeds this
may indeed have implications for what obligations individuals acquire.
This because prior harming and wronging are important sources of obligations.
In fact Seana Shiffrin has argued that procreation does harm children and
that this harm grounds parental duties more generally.23 Agreement is
another source of obligations. If A promises to water B’s flowers while B
is on holiday then A acquires that obligation. Of course anonymous gamete
donors do not agree to make information about themselves available to their
biological offspring or to be open to a relationship with them. But neither
prior harming nor agreement are necessary for the acquisition of moral
responsibilities. Philosophers are apt to recognize a range of duties that
arise in their absence. Examples include the duty of easy rescue, the duty
of beneficence, the duty of gratitude, and a host of special duties to
promote the interests of our friends and family. I will call these obligations
non-voluntary obligations. While the law is less inclined to impose such nonvoluntary obligations one glaring exception is the case of children. Parents
have affirmative duties to promote the interests of their children regardless
22. I. Glenn Cohen, Sperm and Egg Donor Anonymity: Legal and Ethical Issues,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS (Leslie Francis ed., 2015).
23. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the
Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117 (1999).
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of whether they voluntarily accept these duties and even though procreation
generally does not harm children. These obligation are manifest in various
ways including child maintenance obligations, the duty to provide children
with the necessaries of life, and the tort duty to protect children from harm.
Presume for the moment that gamete donors have some such moral
obligations toward their offspring to promote their interests—I will say
more about that below. If we accept this, then pointing to the fact that
gamete donors’ prior actions neither harmed nor wronged their offspring
and that they foreswore such duties will not suffice to get them ‘off the
hook.’ This is because the obligations in question do not arise by virtue of
them having harmed anyone, wronged anyone, or agreed to them. Arguments
about what does or does not constitute prior harm or wrongdoing are thus
irrelevant, as are questions of prior agreement. Consider the following
analogy. Imagine that two friends, X and Y, discuss going on a bike ride
together on a demanding cycle route. X is hesitant because, owing to her
medical skills, she sometimes ends up having to stop and help injured
cyclists, and finds doing so terribly annoying. She eventually agrees on
the condition that they not stop regardless of whether anyone needs their
aid. Partway along the route they come across another cyclist in dire need
of medical aid. Performing the aid would inconvenience X, but would not
be overly burdensome. Those who accept the moral duty of easy rescue
would not conclude that X has been relieved of it on account that ignoring
this duty was a precondition of going on the ride. This is true even though
the decision to go on the ride did not harm the injured cyclist and X
foreswore rendering such aid. If we think that gamete donation results in
duties to advance the interests of one’s biological offspring then, much
like the duty of easy rescue, pointing to the absence of prior harm is no
defense.24
To be clear, the argument here is not a solution to the non-identity
problem. It will not allow us to escape all the counter-intuitive consequences
the problem raises. The range of cases this argument covers is in fact quite
narrow. It will not for example resolve “classic” non-identity cases in which
reproducers opt to have children with congenital impairments rather than
different children without such impairments. This because a feature of

24. Cf. Robert Noggle, Impossible Obligations and the Non-Identity Problem, 176
PHIL. STUD. 2371 (2019). While Noggle makes a similar argument, he applies it to cases of
congenital impairments, which as will be explained below, is an importantly different kind
of case.
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such cases is that there is no subsequent action available to the procreator
that will eliminate the impairment.
Returning to the question at hand, we can now see why problems arise
for gamete donor anonymity. Fox accepts that the interests adults have in
forming a parent-child relationship with biological offspring is deserving
of legal protection and that compensation is owed when this interest is
frustrated. But the reasons for recognizing adults’ interest in this kind of
relationship apply also to children’s interest in having a relationship with
their biological parents. Presumably there is a case for some legal protection
for these interests as well. Perhaps gamete donors ought to be obligated to
make identifying information about themselves available to their biological
offspring. As noted earlier, the law is apt to make exceptions to its general
hesitance to recognize affirmative duties when the well-being of children
is at stake. There are of course multiple ways the law could respond. At
one extreme the law could declare unenforceable contracts protecting the
identity of gamete donors on the grounds that such contracts are contrary
to the interests of children, and require clinics to release their records.
Such a move would be in line with the unenforceability of other kinds of
agreements between adults that courts find detrimental to the interests of
children, like prenuptial agreements settling custody matters, or agreements
between sexual partners that one will not seek child support from the other
in the event of pregnancy. On the other hand, we could decide that public
policy precludes protecting the interests donor-conceived individuals
have in accessing information about their biological progenitors. We
might think that a policy prohibiting donor anonymity would reduce the
supply of gametes, making it harder for same-sex couples, single people,
and infertile couples to become parents. We might think that the social
good gained by allowing such individuals to become parents outweighs
the harms some donor-conceived individuals may face. I cannot adjudicate
this matter here. What I hope to have shown is that Fox’s endorsement of
this kind of reproductive wrong forces a reckoning about how to handle
analogous child-centric interests. If we want to accept Fox’s view and the
regulatory status quo, then we are forced into discounting the interests of
children created via donor gametes for the sake of adults who wish to make
use of donor-assisted reproduction.
An alternate route, and one that may be preferable, is to deny the
importance of biological ties to the family. Some philosophers have argued
that the preference for biologically related offspring is a harmful social
construct that we would be better off without. On this view, the harms
individual suffer as result of leading lives in tension with these norms are
socially constructed. This in not to say that socially constructed harms do
not count as harms. It is just to say that we would be better off if we
eliminated harmful social norms, and one way to go about doing so is
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reduce their purchase by refusing to give them formal recognition.25 My
sympathies lie in this direction. This approach implies that the loss of the
ability to have biologically related children in itself ought not be grounds
for special compensation.
B. Causal Procreative Responsibilities
Of course the preceding argument rests heavily on the view that those
causally implicated in procreation accrue obligations towards their biological
offspring. While the law tends to eschew any such obligations in the case
of gamete donors, within the ethics literature this is not an uncontentious
position. Indeed, Fox relies on the existence of such obligations in defending
the view that individuals suffer harm in cases of reproduction imposed
even in the absence of legally mandated obligations. Citing Niko Kolodny,
Fox notes that individuals in such circumstance suffer the harm of having
obligations to others that they are not in a position to fulfill.26 It is worth
noting that among the obligations Kolodny recognizes is the duty on the
part of gamete donors to be available to their biological offspring and
willing to answer potentially painful questions.27
More generally, causal views about procreative responsibilities align
best with our intuitions and social practices regarding obligations in
reproduction. We generally believe that men in one-night-stand cases have
obligations toward any offspring that result regardless of their reproductive
intent, the precautions taken, or the nature of the relationship with their
reproductive partner. What seems to be doing the work here is the view
that since these men engaged in activity that risked bringing into existence
being who would suffer in the absence of support, these individuals have
an obligation to fulfill those needs. This is true even is a life without such
support would still be a ‘life worth living,’ all things considered.
Consider for example Don Hubin’s defense of this approach to procreative
responsibilities.28 Hubin asks us to imagine a scientist who engages in a
project to create a human being from raw materials and succeeds. Surely

25. Sally Haslanger, Family, Ancestry and Self: What is the Moral Significance of
Biological Ties?, 2 ADOPTION & CULTURE 91 (2009).
26. Niko Kolodny, Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and
Children, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37 (2010).
27. Hubin, supra note 17.
28. Sally Haslanger, Family, Ancestry an Self: What is the Moral Significance of
Biologial Ties?, 2 ADOPTION & CULTURE 91 (2009).
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the scientist has some responsibilities towards the new life she has created.
Simply leaving the being to perish seems impermissible. This is true even
if the short life the being would lead in the absence of aid from the
scientist would be better than no life at all. Part of what makes Hubin’s
case a convincing example lies in the fact that the scientist knowingly and
avoidably chooses to involve herself in a project that has the creation of a
person as its aim. All things being equal, an account that did not ascribe
responsibilities in such cases would be overly narrow. Gamete donors are
like Hubin’s scientist, at least in this respect. Gamete providers freely and
avoidably choose to engage in a project that has the creation of a new
person as its end. This gives rise to a strong prima facie case for ascribing
to them procreative responsibilities. Of course the view that gamete donors
acquire responsibilities toward their offspring need not entail that donors
have a duty to parent. We might think that so long as donors ensure someone
adequately parents their biological offspring, they fulfill the lion’s share
of their obligations. 29 But we might also think that certain obligations
cannot be delegated in this manner because no stand-in is possible. If we
are wed to the idea that some form of relationship with one’s biological
relations serves important interests, being open to such a relationship
might well be one responsibility that cannot be divested to others. We
might think that at a minimum, there is a duty on the part of gamete donors to
provide offspring with some autobiographical information. But this is
contingent on the importance of contact with or information about one’s
biological ancestors to wellbeing. As noted earlier, one way to avoid
imposing these demands on gamete donors is to reject the normative
importance of biological ties.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have discussed how Fox’s arguments extend to two kinds
of cases not explicitly included in his analysis. The first is private reproductive
wrongs. Here I have argued that Fox’s view ought to extend to these cases
in spite of his argument to the contrary. This is a friendly criticism in that
it shows that his view has larger reach than initially anticipated and could
redress reproductive wrongs beyond those initially envisaged. The second
kind of case involves the concerns of donor-conceived individuals who
lack information about their biological progenitors. Here I argued that by
insisting that being deprived of the opportunity of having biologically
related offspring is harm deserving of redress, Fox inadvertently raises
questions about the permissibility of donor anonymity. This is because the
concerns Fox appeals to in justifying this harm apply to offspring denied
29.
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a relationship with their biological progenitors. This consequences gives
us strong reason to reconsider whether the interest in having biologically
related offspring is weighty enough to warrant legal protection. If we insist
that it is, then we are left with difficult questions about potential harm to
donor-conceived children who are cut off from their biological relations.
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